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ABSTRACT 
Endowment economies have generally beeo considered when trying to reproduce the 
empirical rejection of the expectation hypothesis of the term structure as an implication 
of equilibrium asset pricing models. Previolls attempts have not beeo successful: large 
risk aversion parameters are needed to produce sizeable risk premia and even tben, the 
expectation hypothesis is not rejected. We present an econorny with a time~to-build 
technology, in wich consumption 18 subject to cash-in-advance constraints, in wich, the 
expectations hypothesis of the term structure does not boldo Monetary shocks are much 
more important than real demand or supply shocks in producing the resulto 
RESUMEN 
Cuando se ha tratado de explicar teóricamente el rechazo de la hipótesis de expectativas 
que de modo bastante robusto se obtiene para distintos países y mercados, se han utilizado 
modelos de dotación, con resultados negativos. En ellos, es preciso introducir coeficientes 
de aversión al riesgo muy elevado para obtener primas de riesgo apreciables, pero ni 
síquiera entonces se rechaza la hipótesis de expectativas. Presentamos una economía con 
tecnología time-to-build y restricciones de efectivo por adelantado, en la que la hipótesis 
de expectativas acerca de la formación de la estructura intertemporal se rechaza. Las 
perturbaciones monetarias son mucho más importantes que las perturbaciones reales, de 
demanda u oferta, en la generación de este resultado. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A long tradition of empirical work performed 00 a broad variety of markets has led tD a 
widespread rejection of the expectations hypothesis in the formadon of the term structure of interest 
[ates: 'Empirical wark has produced consensus on littte more than that the ... [expectations 
hypothesisj ... can be nyected', Shiller el al. (1983), p.61. [see also Fama (1976, 1984a, 1984b, 1986, 
1990), Fama aod Bliss (1987), aod Shiller et al. (1983)J. 
With the exception of Den Haan(1995), endowment economies bave been used when trying 
tD explain the In those models, the worklleisure decisions 01' consumers play no role in determining 
equilibrium quantities and prices. Furthermore, since the size of the exogenous endowment is usua11y 
the main source of randomness in the econorny, the assumed stochastic structure plays a crucial role 
in determining the equilibrium behaviour of decision and state variables and, in particular. of asset 
prices. Alternatively, a simple representation of the endowment process, estirnated with actual output 
data is added to the model, at the cost of using restrictions not fuUy justified by the equilibrium 
model. In sorne other cases [Dantbine and Donaldsoo(l986)] a given stochastic behaviour for inflation 
is imposed 00 the model, but in none of these instances are the assumed processes fully justified by 
their mode!. 
That limitation tries to avoid tbe difficulties ¡oberent to solving dynamic, stochastic, general 
equilibrium rnodels. In sorne cases [Giovanníni and Labadie(1991), Labadie(1989,1994)], solution 
metbods, specific to tbe econornies considered, have been developed. As an alternative, tractability 
oftbe model's equilibrium ís ofien achieved by assuming a low-dimension state space Markov process 
for endowment. 
In an endowment economy witb two states of narure, Backus, Gregory and Zin (1989) 
concJude that tbe sign of the term premia is contrary to that of fue autocorrelation in tbe marginal rate 
oi substitution of the representative consumer. A similar result, for a somewhat different economy, 
was obtained by Salyer(1990) and Labadie (1994). But. in actual economies, the autocorrelation of 
detrended per capita consumption growth is essentially zero. so tbat equilibrium models that tit the 
behaviour of actual consumption data canoot explain the observed, positive term premia [den 
Haao(1995), Labadie(1994), Baclrus et al.(1989)J. 
In addition, to generate term premia of the magnitude estimated witb US Treasury bills. it is 
necessary to use risk aversion coefficients higher than 8 or 10 [Backus et al.(l989»), which seem 
unlikely. This result is similar in spirit to the equity premium puzzle [Mehra and Prescott(1985)]. But, 
even when the autocorrelation of consumption growth and or the risk aversion coefficient are fixed 
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at values that allow for reproduction of the ohserved term premia, equilibriwn models of endowment 
economies are unahle to produce enough volatility to explain the rejection of the expectations 
hypothesis in actual data [Backus et a1.(1989)]. 
As a sununary, these papers point out to the apparent inability of theoretical equilibrium 
models to explain the sign, magnitude and variability of term premia, spec'ially in the shorter maturity 
end. Mast autbors are aware that the models may be too restricdve to reproduce sorne of the empirical 
observations concerning tbe teITn structure in actual economies. It is particularly interesting that 
sample standard deviations foc the returns on longer maturities are substantially below those of tbe 
shorter maturities [Gibbons and Ramaswany(1986), Backus et al.(1989), Donaldson, Johnsen and 
Mehra(l990»). This is. against the evidence in post-war US data, where the volatilities in nominal and 
real bond retums smoothly decrease as we move to longer maturities, Den Haan (1995) points out 
the bias of traditional monetary modeIs to alarmingly undervalue the variance of nominal returns at 
all maturities, In a paper with endogenous production and a shopping time transaction structure. he 
obtains return volatilitles that smoothly decrease in the term to maturity, taking values close to those 
in actual US data. 
The alternative of considering production economies, as in den Haan(1995), which we also 
adopt in this paper, leads to a full endogenous characterization of equilibrium prices and quantities. 
It precludes reaching closed form expressions for the decision and state variables 00 which to perfonn 
short and the long ron sensitivity analysis, but existing numerical solution methodologies can be used 
to compute the empirical distribution of any characteristic of the stochastic equilibrium vector process 
that represents the economy. 
As in the previous references, our analysis is designed to test whether the empirical evidence 
is consistent with a specific framework to explain term premia, the general equilibrium theory of tbe 
formatioo of asset prices, whose origins are Merton(I973), Lucas(1978), Breeden(I979), 
Brock(1982), and specially, Cox: Ingersoll ami Ross (1985). Such a model implies restrictions that 
characterize the joint time evolution of quantities and prices, which allow for analyzing and testing 
SOrne theoretical aspects of asset priciog beyond tbose considered in purely empirical work [like 
Brown and Dybvig(,\986), Stambaugh(1986), and Gibbons and Ramaswamy(1986)]. 
IncorporatiÓl agents who choose time sequences for tbeir decision variables so as to maximize 
their respective intertemporal objective functions, we can derive time series equilibrium to be 
confronted with tbose from actual econormes. We bring money into our model through cash-in-
advance restrictions as in Lucas(1982) and Svensson(1985). Private as well as public consumption 
must be paid for with cash. A time~to-build technology, as in Kydland and Prescott (1982) uses three 
production ¡nputs: physical capital, inventories, and labor. While we bylieve inventories not to be 
crucial in interest rate detennination, we think that the work/leisure decision plays a relevant role in 
, 
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determining the behaviour of savings and its retums. Furthermore, a time~to-build technology 
provides us with a diversification of investment at tinto different varieties, each with a distioct return. 
The chronology of financial flows produces an inability to spend salaries and rents from 
capital to pay for consumption in the current periodo That, in turn, pegs the equilibrium value of the 
shorter-term nominal interest rate to current real variables. k; a consequence, monetary shocks have 
much more effect on longer terro rates, which become related to inflation fluctuations, losing 
information on future returos. Longer term returns are, as in actual data, less volatile than short-term 
rates, but their volatility increases much more than that of short term returns in the presence of 
monetary shocks. The final result is that current longer term returns have less than perfect information 
on future short-terrn rates, to the point of frequently leading to rejection ofthe expectations hypothesis 
of the term structure. 
Monetary shocks are much more likely than shocks in technology or preferences, to produce 
the variability in tenn premia that leads to rejection of the expectations hypothesis, as it is by and 
large the case in empirica! work. The rejection is also more likely for longer forecast horizons. ~ 
present the structure oftbe model in Section 2, its deterministic steadYMstate being described in Section 
3. We explain in Section 4 how to obtain time series equilibrium realizations. Section 5 contains a 
discussion on tbe equilibrium implications for the term structure of interest rates, and Section 6 
anaIyzes the relative importance of each type of shock for the obtained results. The paper closes witb 
sorne conc1usions. 
2, A MONETARY, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE TERM 
STRUCTURE. 
We consider an economy with a representative household, who owns tite only firm io tite 
economy. There is a Government, which spends sorne resources each periodo financed through lump 
sum taxes, money creation and public debt issuing. Government expenditures do not play any role 
in production, nor do they affect household's preferences. The household is made up of a financia! 
intermediary, a worker, a shopper and a fmn manager. Private, as well as public consumption, must 
be paid for with cash. There are hence cashvio-advance constraints as in Lucas(1982) for the shopper, 
as weU as fOr tbe Government, but just for the consumption good. Investment can be purchased on 
credit. At the beginning of each period t, the household holds money. MI ' which is divided between 
me intermediary and the shopper. Then, the financial intermediary goes to the financial market, the 
shopper goes to tbe commodity market, the manager to the firm, and the worker to the labor market. 
Financial markets open tlrst, and the intermediary, as well as the Government establish their 
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money demands. In addition, the financial intermediary decides the quantity of Government bonds 
she wishes. The Government decides at that paint on its expenditures and financm· g ,--,- . mecUilI.ill;m, l.e., 
on bow much to consume as well as on tbe distribution of its purchasing expenditures between tax 
collections, and net money and bond creation. Tax revenues are collected at tbis point. 
After closing the financial markets, the labor market opeos and production takes place. The 
furo manager hifes sorne lahor and produces output using lahor, the stock of physical capital, and 
inventaries as inputs. Afterwards. the market for the conswnptionlinvestment good opens and both. 
shopper and Government purchase consumption good using the money they acquired in the financial 
market. The fum retains sorne production to flnanee its investment and distributes the rest, as 
dividends, to the household. The cornmodity market closes for the day. 
At tbe end of the session, the firm pays the worker for the labor he provided, and delivers 
the household the dividends obtained during the periodo AH markets are closed, so these funds are 
retained by the household until markets open next day. 
Production: We consider a time to build technology of physical capital accumulation as in Kydland 
and Prescott(1982). Physical capital is subject to depreciation, and needs 1 periods to become 
productive. The fum pays a proportion !p¡ of each project during the )=1,2, .. '/ periods until it 
becomes productive, with !PI + ... + rp I = l. We denote by Sj~ the number of investment units which 
are, at time t,) periods away froro completion. )=1,2, ... ,1. The law of motion for physical capital 
is therefore: 
kl • 1 '" (l-ó)kl + Sil 
S},1>1 '" Sj_II ' 
(1) 
where ó is the rate of depreciation of productive capital. Projects already started are not left 
unfinanced. Choosing SI,! at time t, the firm is deciding the stock of capital ka, which will become 
productive at time t+1. The decision on kl' the stock of capital which 1S productive at time t, was 
made at t-J and before. Total investment, J" is each period the aggregate financing, in different 
proportions, of all iqvestment projects which are not yet completed, together with the variation in 
" inventories: !! 
, 
11 '" L rplil + Y,•1 - Y, 
N 
where Yt+l is the stock of inventories at the end of t. It is a production factor at time t+ l. 
(2) 
The production technology for time t output, q" is again as in Kydland and Prescott(1982): 
,., 
q, '" F(~1I'k,.n"YI) '" t1In,6[(1-o)kt-~ + I1Yt--r· (3) 
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where n, denotes hours of employment, ~1J is a multiplicative shock in productivity that follows a 
stationary distribution with expectation one. The shape of the production function guarantees a 
positive demand for tbe three production inputs each periodo 
At each production point, the firm utUizes the stocks of inventories and physical capital 
accumulated from previous periods. lt observes the realization of tbe random productivity shock, and 
decides how much labor to hire. When the realization of the shock is known to the firm. the stoclcs 
ofphysical capital and inventories are already given. Once output has been produced, the firm pays 
the labor factor, makes investment decisions, and distributes dividends D" Hence, the firro knows 01 
= {k¡.+I+l.s, Y,+l-S' rlr-s' e,_s, h,Ht-J, s?;: 1, when it makes its decisions on labor, ni' and investment, JI' 
This information scheme is in tine with the stochastic structure assumed for the productivity 
shock in Kydland and Prescott(1982)1. Our specification implies that the marginal rate of 
transformation between both types of capital at time t is already known at time t-l, since the shock 
~:n , which appears in the productivity of both types of capital, disappears in their ratio: 
(4) 
The firm distributes output between salary payments, investment and dividends DI: 
(5) 
where all variables, including wages, w" are in real terms, using output as numeraire_ They do so to 
maximize the expected present value of current and futore dividends that will be delivered to the 
household: 
1 Theirs is more complexo The productivity shock is split ioto several components wruch are sequentially 
observed by fue firm_ In that fashion, different decisions are made 00 the basis of distinct informational 
specifications, which allows ror identifying investment 00 inventories apart froro that on pbysical capital. We 
will see in section 5 that our assumption belps in the identificatioo of our roodel as well. 
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Max 
{D"II"J: .. "J,., 1 
E, É (WU:) D, 
,., (6) 
subject to (1), (2), (3) and (5). The fiem discounts future profits using current information2 and, in 
particular, the marginal utility of current consumption, in spite of the faet that dividends will Dot be 
used by the consumer until next periodo 
The optimality conditions are: 
F," '" w, (7) 
(8) 
(9) 
together with the transversality conditions: 
1i~ (J'~J Er (kr +J UT~J) '" O (10) 
limfJ'+l ET~T+1UTc+l) =0 (11) 
where superindeces indicate partial derivatives and Et is the expectation conditional on the information 
set n" 
Along the optima! path, labor is hired each period to the point where its marginal productivity 
is equal to the real wage. New investment projects are started so that the utility loss of devoting 
resources to finance all the projects undee construction is equal to the expected future utility gaio 
derived from the implied inerease in output. Inventories are accumulated to the point where their 
future marginal product is expected to exactly compensate its OWfleT for the current loss ofutility. The 
transversality conditions select patbs along which the expected current value of the terminal stocks 
of physical capital and inventories are each equal to zero. 
The household: 
, 
, 
The household derives utility from the only consumption good, as well as 
from leisure. Total available time is normalized to one each periodo The utility function is: 
2 Notice that the raÚo of two successive discount factors is the marginal rate of substitution of consumpúon 
over time. If we staned from a generic discount factor p." we would obtain that condition as part of the 
cbaracterization of equilibrium. In sorne cases, it is assumed tbat the discount factor used for the film 
incorporates the fact that time t dividends will be used in consumptiOD. al time t+ l. For instance, Christiano 
(1991) use U/+/IP/+ l to discount nominal time t dividends. 
I [¡, II-~" _ 1]1 --r '" _1_ [c"(1 -n)I-~. 
-- e, , 1" I-~ -~ 
E[~II] :: ex Vt 
]' -, - I 
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(12) 
where el' 1" and 1lr denote consumption, leisure and working time, respectively. It is a constant 
relative risk aversion utility function. as in Kydland and Prescott, although with time separability of 
leisure. It ¡neludes a shock ~1t that makes the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
leisure to randomly evolve over time: 
MRS~,I-n 
O:' indicating the relative importance of consumption and leisure in the utility function. 
The household can transfer resources over time buying nominal bonds, B,+1. issued by the 
Government each periad t with maturity horizons j = 1,2, ... ,J. They offer to paya nominal return i! 
when they mature at time t+j. j=1,2, . . ,1. Yields i! on time t bonds are known by investors when 
they are issued and bought. At time t there is a portfolio of bonds maturing, those issued at time t-j 
with maturity j, j=l ,2, ... ,J. The Government also imposes lump-sum taxes T, on the household to 
finance its purchasing expenditures. 
With our proposed chronological sequence of markets, the household owns at the beginning 
of each period: 1) a wide portfolio of nominal bonds with maturities at time t, t+1, ... , t+J-1, 
purchased in previous periods, and 2) Mr = P,.lwr.jn,.l + P,.P'-l rnonetary unilS which brings along 
as the result, at time t- t prices, P'-l> of the activities of the financial intermediary and the worker at 
time t-1: labor rents plus dividends. Financial markets open and the intermediary materializes his 
demand for money M'Hl and bonds, receiving the returns on maturing bonds and paying taxes: 
B:., B;', M:., [Mi P,.,]_ 
__ + ... + _p + P - p - CI-lp -
P, I , , I 
.J B/-{J-l) 
+ ... + (1 +I,_J)-p--
, 
(13) 
-7; 
Afier the financial markets close, the worker offers sorne of bis time, output is produced, and 
the cornmodity market opeos. There, the shopper faces a liquidity constraint that forees her to pay 
for consumption good with rnoney: 
(14) 
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where M,C +1 is tbe quantity of money she brings from the money market, and P, 1S the price of me 
consumption commodity. So long as nominal interest rates are positive. which will be the case in 
equilibrium, this cash-in-advance constraint 1S satisfied with equality. At the end of the period, tbe 
worker receives salary payrnents and dividends are given to tite household. the only owner of tbe 
firmo 
The household chooses consumption and leisure each period to maximize the expected present 
value of current and future utUity, discounted at rate (:J, O <f:J < 1, on the basis of the information set 
{nl_r, c,_s, DI_s, tlJ+L-j. s;;?; 1} and subject to the budget constraint (13) and the cash-in-advance 
constraint (14): 
Max (ji U(c¡. II) 
given ioitial conditions: Mo
c
, B; , ... , B~J-l) 
taking as given: i,l , i/, r/, ...• r/, TI' P" W, 
leading to the optimality conditions: 
(l5) 
j" 1.2 •... ,1 (l6) 
and transversality conditions: 
lim E. [w U; ;:' 1 "o 
(17) 
lim E, [w U; Bk 1 "o j"I.2 •... ,I 
• 
Equation n~) has a clear interpretadon: working one more hour today raises revenues by the 
nominal wage: P f",~J at tbe same time it decreases current utility by utn• The proceedings can be used 
tomorrow to purchase tbe consumption commodity. The expected ¡nerease in tornorrow's utility of 
an additional unit of curreney 1s given by the conditional expectation in (15). In terms of current 
utility, we have to discount by {J. 
Combining (15) and (16) forj=l, the optimal consumption/leisure decisions by the bousebold 
is characterized by: 
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(18) 
whicb can be seen as tbe supply of labor function. The worker supplies hours of work to the point 
where the marginal rate of substitution between current consumption and leisure becomes equal to real 
wages. Labor payrnents are discounted by the return on one periad bonds because they cannot be 
spent until t+ l. By definition. the demand for leisure is the complement to one of n,: 1, = 1-n/. 
We eoutd have equivalently considered real bonds issued at time t, b,+!, j=1,2 •... ,J. paying 
real returns rl at time t+ j. We would then have optimality eonditions involving real rates of interest: 
(l9) 
A coodition similar to (18) does not arise with real returns. precisely because tbe friction not to be 
allowed to use current salary payments io today's consumption precludes tbe household to shelter 
from inflation. 
The quantities demanded of the bonds at different maturities, b/. b/, .... b/ are not fully 
identified. since tbey are all substitutable assets. Supply conditions would be oeeded to eharacterize 
íbem. We can however obtain the total amollnt of resources devoted to purchasing Government bonds 
each period, but oot its alloeation among the different maturities. Witbout 10ss of generality we treat 
the whole portfolio as a single \ln-pedad bond. That will not preclude us from determining the 
nominal and real returns of eaeh individual bond, whose characteristics at tbe distinct horizons, 
j=1,2, .. .1. will be difl'erent in an endogenous way. 
Tbe Government: The Government realizes a consumptioo G/, which finances raising taxes, T" 
and issuing money and bonds: 
B,I"I - (1+i/_I)B/1 
p • 
+",+ 
B~I - (1 + i/_J) B'~(/_l) 
P, 
(20) 
where G/, T" M" p,. B,I, ... , B'_IM/' il_/ ..... i,./ represent publie consumption at t,lump-sum taxes, 
rooney at the end of period t-1, time t prices, the volume of bonds issued in periad tj, j= 1 ,2 •.. .J all 
maturing at t, and their respective nominal rates ol' returnJ . 
We assume the Government is successful at maintaining its planned expenditure poliey. and 
J Witb bonds paying interest at all periods before maturity, this restriction gets more complicated, but our 
problem does not gain any generality and results do oot change. 
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also that this adopts a very simple torm, being constant over time: 
G > O given, for all t (21) 
We keep a simple public expenditure paliey because we want to concentrate on the relevance of 
monetary paliey. as well as random production and preferences, in explaining the main characteristics 
of the term structure. 
Public consumption must be paid foe with money> so that the government is subject to a cash~ 
in-advance constraint similar to that of the consumer: 
G '" Mr~t 
P, 
so that it needs to purchase money in the financial markets at time t. 
(22) 
On the other hand, we assume that the Government has a less than perfect control of the 
growth rate of money supply: 
(23) 
which is subject each period to a random deviation from its target. In real terms: 
(24) 
Fiscal paliey is defined by a constant level of public consumption and a lump-sum tax each 
period, which varies over time as a function of the stock of debt. and an equation is needed that 
determines either the evolution of the stock of bonds. or the tax rule. In tbe simpler ease when there 
are just one period bonds and the money supply is controled with no error, we get: 
1 +i, 1 m ; __ b, + __ (G-T,) - (g-t) __ ' 
1+11", 1+11", 1+1I"r 
(25) 
where b, = B/PI and we have used the faet (hat public consumption is paid for with Government 
money holdings. P,) well-known long-ron equilibrium condition in the detenninístic case wbich is 
!J 
expected to also h~ld bere is that the gross real rate of interest (1 +r) be equal to the inverse of the 
discount parameter (J, and being tbis less tban one, the previous is an explosive first order 
autoregression in bll although the presence 01' taxes and money growth will tend to stabilize ir. To 
avoid this lack of stationarity, and ignoring the stabilizing effect of money growtb, we can fu: a tax 
schedule whicb responds to the stock of bonds: 
\ 
4 Monetary contractíons would tend to destabilize the time evolution of b¡-
II 
(26) 
wbere lump-sum taxes have each period a constant component, T, plus a component that depends on 
tbe stock of bonds through a. A relationship 01' this kind guarantees stability of the systemS [see 
Leeper(1991) and Sims(1994)]. 
To surnmarize, the Government starts the period by decidíng on public consumption, taxes 
and the amount (positive or negative) 01' money and bonds that wishes to put in circulation. When 
financial markets open, the government buys money, pays the consumerfinvestor me retorn on the 
maturing bonds, puts in circulation new money and bonds, and collects taxes. After that, the market 
for tbe consumption good opens, and the Government uses its money holdings to purchase tbe desired 
commodity units. 
Equilibrium: Given parameter values, including public expenditures G and money growth g, and 
paths for taxes 1; and bonds B,+II •... , B,+/, a eompetitive equilibrium is a set of initial conditions: Po, 
Moc, Mo G. Yo, ko, S lJ)' Sl.O>.'" SJ.l.0 together with real functions defined on (O, (XI): {e" Ir, llt,d, k,+}, Y'+1' 
i) given i,',. o o. ii, r,'., ri, P,. w" 1;, and the initia1 conditioDS M." B"',. .. , B",o.,', the vector 
01' functions {e,. Ir, M¡+/, B'+lI, .. , B,+/} solves the utility maximization problem of the 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
v) 
vi) 
consumer, 
givenyo, kl» slJ}> s2.l»' ., sJ.1,O' PI' WI , the functions: {nrd, kr+J• YI+1' D,} solve the maximízation 
problem of the firm, 
l-J
I 
= n
1
d for all t, which determines equilibrium in the labor market, 
M,c + M¡G = MI for all t, the aggregate money demand by consumer and Government is 
equal to the money supply, 
the household purchases aH bonds of different maturities j=1,2, ... ,J, issued by the 
Government, 
the budget and cash-in-advance constraints (20) and (22) tor the Government are satisfied at 
aU periods. 
5 Substituting ¡ruo (25): 
l+i-a T ; __ '__ b 
1 +11"1 ' 
it is easy to see tbat so long as aT falls inside the open intervals (i,-1I", • 1 +iJ and (1 +i,,2+i,+1I"J, dIe resulting 
autoregressive process will be stationary. 
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Equilibrium in the labor market implies that the marginal rate of substitution between current 
consumption and ¡eisure is equal to the marginal product of labor, normalized by short-term nominal 
rates: 
(27) 
On the other hand, it is easy to see that Walras' law guarantees mat equilibrium holds in the 
consumption commodity market: First, the budget constraints of household and Government, can be 
combined into: 
+ G- M,<.-M, 
P, 
P¡-l W'_l n'_l + P,_¡D,_t 
P, 
(28) 
But, since the Government is subject to a cash-jn-advance constraint, and the money rnarket is in 
equilibrium, Le .• M,e + MrG = M" then (28) implies: 
(29) 
so that the financial flow that fue consumer receives at the end of t-1 is equa! to the total money 
supply. If we write (29) at time t+1. divide through by P" and substitute the money market 
equilibrium conwtion iv) in the aggregate cash-in-advance constraints of both agents: 
c, + G '" (g+~:J/) m, (30) 
we get: 
(31) 
The right hand term in (31) is equal. from the firm's constraint (5), to production, net of investment. 
That way, we get: 
(32) 
, 
which implies equil~~rium in the market for the consumption commodity, where output is splít among 
,~ 
private and public consumption. plus investment. 
3. DETERMINISTlC STEADY·STATE 
In the deterministic steady-state of this model with diminishing returns in each productive 
4 
I 
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input, all decision and state per capita variables are constant over time6• and random shocks are equal 
to their rneans. The optimality conditions of tbe consumer and the firmo together with their budget 
constraints and that of the Government plus fiscal and monetary policy rules, imply, in a deterministic 
steady state: 
1-~ "F!(k',n',y') 
~ 
1 +i~ 
= ___ ",1+~ 
{3i (l+n-°Y 
l+n-" =g 
CO + ók' + G '" F(k",n",y") 
c" + G = (1+1fO)m' '" gm" 
D" =q' -w"n" -ók" ==F(k",n',y') -w"n' -ók' 
, 
l' = E 'P (ok') 
, ' 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
where stars denote steady state values, meaning that, in steady state. the rate of inflation i8 equal to 
the rate of money creation. We also have in steady state: SI.,' = lik' = S~H = S],1'1 = ... = sJ,,·(J·w 
The gross real rate of ¡nterest onj-periods is the inverse of pi, while the gross nominal return is equal 
to the real rate times inflation rate accumulated over the maturity of the asset. The marginal product 
of inventories goes to O when {3 approaehes 1, and ¡nereases without bound as {3 falls to zero. In that 
case, steady state investment would be equal to zero. Knowing ¡nterest rates, steady state stock of 
6 In general, steady state would be me siruation of constan! growth rates for the relevant per capita variables 
can be maintained forever. In this neodassical model with diminismng retums in all production inputs. tbe only 
sustainable value for those growth rates is zero. 
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physical capital, inventaries, and the levels of employment and consumption are simultaneously 
derived frorn (33), (34), (35) and (40), for a given level of public consumption. Note that, tbrough 
inflation, the rate of money creatioo affects nominal ¡nterest rates, which influence the steady state 
levels of consumption and leisure as well as those of physical capital, inventaries and output. We get 
output fram the production function. real balances tram (41) and finally, (37) and (39) provide us 
with the long-roo equilibrium values of tump-sum taxes and bonds as functions of the level of pubüc 
cODsumption, G. Real wages are equal to the marginal product of labor, dividends are given by the 
difference between autput and the aggregate of salary payrnents and investment. the latter being just 
the depreciation los5. 
4. EQUILIBRIUM ANAL YSIS 
The stochastic properties ol' this general equilibrium model cannot be characterized 
analytica11y. since the optímality conditions contain conditional expectations of nonlinear functions 
of state and decision variables. They can however be estimated through anaIysis of equilibrium time 
series realizations, which is what we do in the following sections. By an equilibrium realization we 
mean a set of time series foe the relevant variables that tluctuates around the detenninistic steady state 
we just described. 
4.1 Stability conditions 
Numerical characterization of the equilibrium requires the use of stability conditions, since 
the optimality conditions and poliey rules by themselves will not produce stable trajectories. Por that, 
it is necessary to specify tbe stochastic processes followed by the structural perturbations in 
preferences. productivity. and money control. which will have to be stable. Tú obtain the stability 
conditions. we represent the system made up by all the mentioned equations, together with the 
processes for the structural shocks in technology, preferences, and money growth: 
H (ZpZ¡_I •... 'Z¡_J) "" O 
(45) 
, ( b T· 1 ·2 .J I 2 J 1:. 1:. 1:.) Z¡"" cr,n¡,kl~J'YPI,m¡, ¡.1ft , t,lt-I' ,lt_2, ... ,tt_J,'¡_1 ,'t-2, ... ,"-J' '>U' '>21''>31 
for which a first order Taylor approximation can he constructed and writren as a multivariate 
autoregression in deviations with respect to steady state values: 
where: 
i: = {c
, 
-c·, nI -n * ,kt+J_1 -k* 'Yt -y •• mt -m*, b, -b·, 1r¡-1f*, T, - T·. 
i=O.I •...• J 
which can be converted to a tIrst order autoregression: 
where: 
-, x, 
Ho O O O 
O 1 O O 
A= O O 1 O 
O O O 
{z:, Z:-l , ...• z:-(J-o} 
-H, -H, 
1 O 
B = O 
O O 
-H, 
O 
O 
-H, 
O 
O 
O .. 1 O 
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(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
where 1 is the identity matrix of order J and to the equations mat form system (46), we have added, 
in a standard fashion, auxiliary equations to acconunodate in me state vector the lags in that system. 
Stability conditions are obtained as orthogonality conditions between the state vector zr and the 
eigenvectars corresponding to eigenvalues in the product matrix AlT1 with modulus greater than (tI. 
Solving the model, we lag all the optimality conditions that envolve variables at different 
points in time: (8), (9), (16) and (19), so as not to tInd in Zr consumption or labor beyond time t. We 
also lag tbe Government budget constraint so as not to have future prices in the system. As a 
consequence, physical capital and inventaries appear just in the global constraint of resources for the 
whole econorny. so the cotumos in Ho associated to tbese two variables have nonzero values just in 
the row corresponding to that constraint. Matrix HI), and hence, A, are then singular. We avoid that 
by also lagging one period the global resources cons[raint. The infinite eigenvalue which indicated 
singularity then disappears. The eigenvalues 01' the transformed system, all finite, numerically 
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coincide with the remaining eigenvalues of rhe original system7• 
The number of stability conditions ¡nereases with the number of maturity pedods considered, 
being equal to J + 1: 
gl (er , nI ,k'+J_l' YI , mI' r/_l , r;_'2' o •• , r::~'I' ~u. ~2t' ~31Ilaggedvalues) = O (50) 
i = 1, ... , J+1 
The real rate of retum on the lauger bond never shows up in the stability conditions. Variables from 
the monetary sector: bonds, nominal cates and intlation and tiscal variables, public expenditures and 
taxes, do not appear in the stability conditions either. If we did not impose condition (26) that taxes 
were pegged to the stock of real bonds, then thefe would be an additional stability condition linking 
the stock of real bonds to state and decision variables. Any small deviation from its steady state would 
produce an explosive equilibrium trajectory. 
Introducing in the model an active publie expendirure poliey, Iinking it to deviations of output 
from its steady state, for example, does not alter the number of stability conditions. 
4,2 Equilibrium time series 
To solve the model, we follow Siros suggestions (1984,1989,1990) to write the expectations 
of nonlinear functions of future state and decision variables that appear in the optimality conditions 
as being equal to their realized value plus the corresponding expectation error. There is no 
approximation error involved in that representation. We have 2J + 2 equations involving expectations: 
two sets ofJ optimality conditions in nominal and real bonds (16) and (19), plus optimality eonditions 
(8) and (9) on K'+J and Yl+¡' There also are 2J+2 expectation errors: 
el '" U,~ - EI _¡ U,~; j '= 1,2 .... ,1 ; 
uf = ~,' - E,.} [ ~: 1 j = 1,2,. .. ,J ; 
Since there are [bree structural shocks. then tbefe can be at most three independent 
expectation errors. Errors associated to [he expectations of the same function, lilee el and uf, 
1 Tbis difficulty does nOl mean mat me two assets are redundant. For tbat. the~r optimality conditions should 
coincide, which happens just when Ehe dcpreciation rate is zero. A possible redimdancy culd not possibly be 
solved by just lagging an equation, and some additional idenúfying assumption would be needed. 
4 
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j=I,2, . .. ,J with same origin and different forecasting borizon are moving average processes, having 
as innovation the one step ahead expectation error. In addition, the fact that the marginal rate of 
transformation between both types oí' capital belongs to the previous period information set implies 
the exact relationship: 
(5I) 
between the innovation E/ in the E/ -expectation error and a/. Hence, only three of the innovations 
are independent: u/, e/ and either a,' or E/. 
If we rewrite the conditional expectations as we said, then we have the system formed by: a) 
the J+ 1 stability conditions (50), b) the econorny-wide cash in advance constraint (30), e) the 
constraint on global resources: 
eH + rpJ(kl.¡J_l) - (1-ó)k,.(J_2») + ... + rpt(kl-(l-ó)kt-l) + 
Y I - Y,-t + G '= F (~2(1-!) ,k1_1 .n'_1 ,Y,_¡) 
(52) 
which comes from combining O). (2) and (32), d) the optimality conditions on capital stock and 
inventaries: 
rp + rpJ-¡ - (1 -ó)rpJ + <PJ-2 - (1 -ó)<PJ_¡ + .. __ (_1 -_Ó_),_~_l '" (lJ F/'U/
c
- E/ 
J 1 +r,I_J 1 +r,1_J 1 +r,_J Ut _J 
(S') 
1 +r/_l 
(9') 
from dividing (8) and (9) by U/, using (19) and making explicit the expectation error, e) equation 
(51) that links the innovations E/ and a/, and t) the moving average relation between E/ and EIJ 
produce a set of J+7 equations involving time-t decisions: kt+J.l' y" e" n" 111.¡, the J real interest 
rates: r,./, r,./, r,./, ... , rJ, 5 innovations: a/, f:/, ~ll' ~Zt, ~jl and E/. a total of J+ 11 variables, so 
that 4 variables will be needed to obtain equilibríum sample realizations. 
In this paper, we take J = 4 periods to be needed for capital to become productive. Applying 
the procedure in section 4.1, the resulting 5 stability conditions oftype (50) can be written: 
e, '" gl (k'*3,k"2,k,.¡.k, ,y"m"~\"~2"~JI) 
n, '" g2 (kt+3,k,.2,k,.¡,k, ,y"m"~lt'~Zl'~31) 
't~l "" g3 (c,_1,n,_¡,kl•3,k,.2,kl.\,kl '~\I'~\I-¡'~2') 
,,2_2'" g4 (e'_2,n'_2,k,.3,kl*1,k,.¡,k,"'~2'~II'~\I-2,t2l) 
(50.1) 
(50.2) 
(50.3) 
(50.4) 
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(50.5) 
Equations (50.1), (50.2), (50.3) together with (30), (52), and (9') can be used to salve for: 
{e" ni' kl+J' YI' mi' r,.J 1=1,2 ... , as functions of (el •l • n/_l, k,+z. k'+J' kl' kl _l • YH> ~ll' tlNJ ~1V l;2H' 
tJp a!J. This block is solved taking as inputs sample realizations for four variables: ni/> l;2t, l;jl' a!J 
t=0,1,2 ... , and initial conditions (k(» S¡.(» 52,0> SJ,o> yJ. For the ¡nitial period (t=O), el» na. and m{) are 
simultaneously obtained from (50.1), (50.2) and (30). Starting from them, the restofinitial conditions 
and the values of the input variables al [= 1, we obtain (el' ni' k41 y]l mi' roJ. Using the vector (el' 
n/. k41 kp kz• k l , YI' {11' {2J) together Wilh the realizations of the input variables at t=2 we obtain (e2, 
n¡. ks. Y2' m2• r1> and so Oll. 
Once we have time series for consumption, labor, capital, inventaries, real balances and one 
period real interest rates, tben twO and {bree period real interest rates are calculated from (50.4) and 
(50.5). With all tbem and a sample realization foe {E~y, equilibrium real interest rates on four period 
investments are obtained from (8'). Intlation is obtained from (24) and the series for the price level 
derives from an initial price level and the intlation series. Expectation errors el, j=1,2.3.4 are 
obtained !rOID the lagged, expanded version of (19): 
j" 1, ... ,1 (19') 
the one period nominal interest cate i,.! ¡ comes from (27) written at t-1, and taken to the similar 
version of (16) for j=l: 
U,'_¡ = .'¡(l +.¡ ) [ U,' - ¡] p ¡.r t,_j - Uf 
l-j P, 
(16') 
produces u/. Conditional on a MA process foe expectation errors uf, equation (16') 
is used to obtain nominal cates for j> 1. Finally, bonds and taxes are derived from the Government 
budget constraint (20) and me fiscal poliey rule (26). Hence, these two variables are not needed to 
generate equilibriumyalues for the rest of variables in the model. This only shows that the Ricardian 
" proposition holds inMthis mode!. 
:S 
This solution procedure was implemented tor a baseline set of parameters, similar to those 
used in related eesearch by different authors, shown in Table 1. Six experiments were ron with either 
8 This expectations error is not independ~nt of a/, wruch has beeo used to obtain series for consumption . 
labor, physicial capital. inventories and one-perlod real interest rates. We generated time series realizations fo~ 
it as a MA(3) process with illllOvation E,I, whose sample realization was obtained from tbat for a/ /=0.1.2 •... 
lbrough (51). 
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just the shock in technology or in preferences, the two afthero simultaneously, as well as the three 
same exercises, adding the money growth shock. The results of these experiments are surnmarized 
in Tables 2 to 5, which contain estimated regressions that we describe now. 
5. TIIE EXPECTA TIONS HYPOTHESIS OF TIIE TERM STRUCTURE. 
Having derived equilibrium realizations for the nominal returns, implicit one-period forward 
returns at t for time r+j are obtained by: 
1 + ji 
+f/;; --.-' 
1 + i:- I j " 2, 3, ... , J 
while the return on holding at time t for one period an asset which is j periods away from maturity 
¡S9: 
1 + il j " 2, 3, ... , J 
The forward rate f! is a proxy for i:+j.}' while the holding return is a proxy for ;1/ • The 
former is known at time t, while the holding retuen h! is realized at t+ l. Their differeoces to the 
current short-term spot rate: f( - e/+j.1 and HP'+l = h( - i/ are known as ex-post term and holding 
premium, wbile j{ _ e
r 
is labelled the forward premium. There is a tradition of interpreting these two 
premia as measures of risk, although the association is far from c1ear, specially in the case of the tenn 
premium. There are also ex-ante versions of (he two premia, detined as: jf - ElS+j •1 and HPs+1 = 
EN - i/. The ex-post premia inelude their ex-ante versions, plus an expectation error. 
Fama(1984) shown that: 
so that, under the assumption that the sum of the expectation changes is negligable, then the forward 
return is just the suro of expectations of future short-tenn spot returns and ex-ante holding premiums. 
The decomposition is exact for j = l. 
The expeetations hypothesis of the term structure states that holding premia are zero. 1ben, 
9 The definition of implicit, k-period forward returns and the retum on holding for k periods an 
asset that isj periods, j > k, away from maturity is detined similarly, We consider in our empirical 
exercises just one-period returos in both cases. Notice que h/ = f/ = i/. 
20 
f¿ would just be the expectation of the one-period return at time t+ j-l, E,i:+j-J' The difference hetween 
both would then just be an expectation error which, under rationa! expectations, would he white fioise 
foc j=l, having a MA(j-l) structure whenj>I. Ifwe substraet i/ from both rates, we have a 
regression roadel: 
iJ~_1 - i/ '" a + (J if/ - i/) + uHj _¡ j '" 2,3, ... (54) 
Oil which the expectations hypothesis imposes the restrictions: Ho: 0:= O, {3 = l. The altemative is that 
forward rates incoIlJorate a premium to the expectation of future returns, that will be considered 
constant if a;éO but {1=l. Otherwise, if tbe risk premium fluctuates with sorne correlation with 
current forward rates, we will have {3 < 1 even under the Dull hypothesis since slope estimates will 
be biased towards the origino Besides, there should not be any autocorrelation left in tbe residuals of 
that regression if we use the forward for t+ 1, otherwise acquiring the mentioned moving average 
structure due to the overlap of several foreeast errors. 
Empirical evidence is uniform in the rejection of the expectations hypothesis. Fama 
(1976,1984a,1984b,1986, 1990), Fama and Bliss(1987) and Shiller e, al.(1983), al! find ~ " 1, even 
though such unanimity disappears when evaluating the ability of the term structure to forecast future 
short-term rates, since sorne authors find negligable estimates for (jo The several papers by the former 
authors find sorne power in the current term structure to foreeast future interest rates and holding 
returns. In contrast, no predictive power is found by Shiller et al.(1983) and Backus et al.(1989). 
A second piece of evidence against the expectations hypothesis is that observed, ex-post, term 
premia are usually sizeable, being more volatile at the short end of the maturity Structure. Backus et 
al. (1989) report significant average monthly terro and holding premiums for the US T-bills roarket. 
6.1 Forward rates as predictors of future spot returns. 
The empirical literature has analyzed this issue using a whole array of variants of (54). 
Farna(1984a), Fama and Bliss(1987), Shiller et al.(1983) estimate (54) for different horizons, wbile 
Backus et al.(1989) u~~ the ex-post premium, taj.l -JI as dependent variablelO • A significant constant 
in the regression is 3nterpreted as a constant terro premiurn, by irself a weak rejeetion of the 
expectation hypothesis. A slope different than one is interpreted as a stronger evidence agaínst that 
hypothesis, leading to the belief that there is aterro premium in current rates which evolves over time 
10 Fama(1984a} works wifumonthly data, while Shiller et al.(1983} and Backus et al.(1989) use quarterly 
data. Fama and Bliss(1987) use annual data. ~ 
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and is correlated with the forward premium. 
Observed small but significant average ex-post terrn premia in actual markets initially 
suggested Roll(1970, eh.5) and Fama(1976, table 1), among others, that at the least, constant term 
premiums existed. Addltionally, estimated slopes different from one have been obtained when using 
the forward premium in (54) [Fama(1984a, table 4) and Shiller et al.(1983, table 3)]. In what might 
be tbe most popular study in this class, slope estimates in Fama(1984a) oscillate between 0.11 and 
0.46. This leads to rejection ofthe expectation theory, although leaving sorne forecasting power in 
forward rates. With quarterly US Treasury bills data, and the same sample period, Baclrus et 
aI.(1989) obtain similar results using prices, rather than retums. They also provide lower bounds of 
0.00157 and 0.00164 for the standard deviations of fue terro and holding premiums, respectivelyll. 
They summarize: 'Viewed as predictors, forward rates consistently overestimate juture spot rates, and 
the 'forecas! errors' are systematicalIy related lo variables lha! are known when the forecast is made. 
Iñe consensus in Ihe profession seems lo be that Jorward rates contain, besides forecasts of juture 
spot rates, riskpremiums that change over time'. Startz(1982) presents similar values for monthly 
data. This literature is reviewed in Shiller and McCulloch(1990). 
We interpret our model as producing quarterly observations. which is consistent with the 
chosen parameterization, specially, the 0.99 value for the discount factor (J. The results of estirnating 
(54) with our simulated series appear in Table 2, far a baseline parameterization, and different 
specifications of economy-wide shocks, showing that: 
1) 
2) 
Exeept in experiment 1, the slope estimates fall in the interval (0,1), being significantly 
different from both endpoints. Being different from 1, they lead to rejection of the 
expectations hypothesis, while, being different from zero, they concede sorne explanatory 
power to the forward rate as a predictor of future shorHerrn interest rates. This is consistent 
with evidence in Farna(1984a, Table 4) and Fama and Bliss(1987, Table 3). In the first 
regard, they agree with the results in Shiller et a1.(1983, Table 3), and Backus et al.(t989, 
Table 2), even though, as we have already mentioned, the latter Ímd little explanatory power 
on the forward rate to predict future interest rates. 
The forecasting power 01 the fOJward rate for future shon term rates decreases with the 
forecast horizon in experiments 4 to 6. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence 
in Fama(1984a, Table 4), where monthly data are used, but not with Fama and Bliss(t987, 
Table 3) using annual data. 
11 obtained as the standard deviation of the fitted values in the regressions. 
22 
A different set Di regressions between the first differences of future spot [ates and forward 
[ates is considered in Fama(1984a). He interprets the regressions in our Table 2 as measuring the 
accumulated change in the spot rate between t and t+j. The forecasting ability of this cumulative 
change may be due to the ability to forecast specific marginal changes which are part of the 
accumulated change. Far instanee, for j "'" 2 ,i\+2-i\ can be decomposed into: (i\+z-i\+¡) + 
(i\+l-jlJ. Since (i\+z_jlJ can be explained by (j(_iL) and O\+l-i\) by ({(-tlJ, it is reasonable to 
presume that the difference between the dependent variables can be explained by the difference of the 
independent variables, Le., that U\+z-Pt+¡) may depend 00 lf?-f/). 111at way. we can determine the 
extent to which the forecasting ability of the forward [ate on the accumulated change on spot rates 
depends on the ability of the forward premium to forecast sorne of the marginal changes in the global 
change in the spot rateo To do so, Fama(1984a) suggests regressions of differences of forward artes 
at t for different maturities. 
1) 
2) 
The results in Table 3 show that: 
Theforecasting ability is high and significant at al! horizons. The coefficients associated to 
the different forecasting horizons are roughly equal. A similar statement applies to the 
coefficient of determination and the residual autocorrelation. In sum, the forecasting ability 
of the forward rate for t+ 1 on the future rate i1'+1 is the same than that of the forward rate 
for t+2 on the future rate P1+2. Fama found that, in actual data before 1974, the forecasting 
ability decreased with the forecasting horizon, being non -zero in a11 cases. After 1974, the 
significant forecastíng horizon becomes much shoner, which he justified by the faet that the 
volatility of the flIst difference in spot rates was almost twice that of the differenced forward 
rates while, before 1974, both volatilities were similar. 
Fama(1984a) finds a reduction in the estimated standard deviations, together with an increase 
in the coefficient of determination when using the first differences of future spot rates and the 
implicit forward rates in assets with successive maturity dates as dependent and independent 
variables, resijectively. We also have, for each forecasting horizon, higher estimated standard 
deviations atid estimated standard error of the regression in Table 2 than in Table 3, while 
, , 
the coefflcie;t of determination is lower. 
Figure 1 shows, for one sample realization with the three structural shocks, the time series 
of interest rate time differences versus the forward premium. The upper graph corresponds to the near 
future differential: i
H
/ - i/, while the lower graph corresponds to the longer term difference: í,+/ -
i/. The HE line corresponds to the expectations hypothesis, while the othef Hne is the Meo estimate. 
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The distance between them is greater for the longer term change in interest rates, at the same time 
the dispersion in the sample seems to be wider. That is why the expectations hypothesis is rejected 
more clearly for the latter case. 
6.2 The [orward rate as an explanatory variable [or the holding premium. 
The similar conclusions are reached from regressions of the holding premium h/j-i/, on 
the forward premium. Under rationality, according to (54), any detected relationship between the 
holding premium and any variable in the information set is necessarily capturing a relationship 
between that variable and the terro premium. That is why one can be taken as evidence of the other. 
Table 4 contains estimates of the regressions between the holding premium and the forward premium, 
for different horizons: 
h( - i/ '" a + {3 (JI - i/) + u,.t (55) 
Like (54), this regression is specified as in Fama(1984a, Table 4), Fama and Bliss (1987, Table 1), 
and Backus et al.(1989), being different frorn those in Shiller et al.(1983). These authors find 
substantial variability in the holding premium. A positive slope in this equation would ten us that the 
current forward -spot differential has prediction power for future holding premiums, the same way 
a positive slope in the previous set of regressions was telling us that the forward-spot differential 
had explanatory power for future changes in the one-period spot rateo So, the slope in (55) tells us 
whether the expected premium component of the forward rate varies through time in a way that shows 
up reliably in the future premium. Likewise, the slope in (54) tells us whether the expected future 
spot rate component ofthe forward rate has variatioo that shows up reliably in future spot rates. We 
must bear in mind that regressions of the expected premium for different horizons are concerned with 
one-period holding premiums (all observed at t+ 1) 00 T -bills with different maturities. In contrast, 
the i\+i-1 - ~1 regressioos for different j were concerned with forecasts of changes in the one-period 
spot rate across different number of periods. 
According to the pure expectations hypothesis [Meiselmen(1962), Kessel(1965)], there are no 
expected premiums in forward rates, and all the variation in the forward premium: f! -i¡ is due to 
expected changes in the spot rate: E,ftIl+i_¡-i1J. That would imply {3=O in (55), and 13=1 in (54), 
Our results in Table 4, for dífferent horizons: j =2,3,4 and different combinations of shocks 
show that: 
1) since we obtain in (54) and (55) values in the interval (0,1), we have a richer situation where, 
in fact, expectations of future holding premiums, as well as those of future spot rates, both 
2) 
3) 
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contained in the forward premium vary in a way which shows up reliably in future holding 
premia and short terrn rates. Heoee, the forward cate has prediction power toe both, the 
holding premium and the change in the spot rateo 
The estimated slope is positive, and increasing in the terro to maturity. We then conclude, as 
tbese authors do, the existence of aterro premium which evolves ayer time, and depends 00 
the forward premium. Changes in estimated slopes ayer different maturities are wider in our 
madel than in actual economies. 
The slopes in tables 2 and 4 foe allj=2,3,4 approximately add up to ooe. That expected 
relationship is anaIytically shown in Fama and Bliss(1987 [12], [13], pag.683). 
Farna(1984a) suggested to also examine the relation between differences of holding excess 
returns, using assets maturing at adjacent periods. and differences in forward rates. The results of 
these regressions are presented in Table 5, where it can be seen that: 
1) 
2) 
There is sorne explanatory power in the differences of the forward premia with respect to the 
differences of the implicit returns. but there is no specific relation between coefficients and 
horizon. This result is consistent. although weaker. than the empirical evidence in 
Fama(1984a)12. 
Farna(1984a) shows that the sum of the slopes in Tables 3 and 5 should be expected to be 
equal to 1, although such a condition does not hold in the empirical results beyond one 
periodo In this negative aspect, the results in Tables 3 and 5 are also consistent with the 
empirical evidence. 
Figure 2 presents a sample realization, this time plotting the holding premium versus the 
forward premium, for assest maturing 2 (upper graph) and 4 periods from now (lower graph). In this 
case, the horizontal axis corresponds to the expectations hypothesis. Even more c1early tban in Figure 
1, dispersion increases and the estimated Hne separates more from the expectations hypothesis 
reference the longer }erm we consider. 
Jt ~1 
7. THil D1FFERENTIAL lMPORTANCE OF STRUCTURAL SHOCKS. 
We have performed simulations of our model economy using different combinations ofthe 
shocks in preferences, teclmology, and the rate of monetary growth, in order to test the relative 
12 He observes a behaviour which is irregular in the foreease horizon, the lower slopes bejng those for two 
periods, increasing up to 4 periods. and tbeo decreasing again as we foreeast 6 periods ahead. 
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importance of each souree of fluctuations on the characteristics we have generated for fue term 
structure. A comparison of the six pannels in Tables 2 to 5 shows that the rejection of the 
expectations hypothesis in our general equilibrium madel is far more cIear when there is a monetary 
shock in the econorny. Estimated slopes for (54) faH from values between 0.97 and 0.99 when just 
the shock in preferences is present, to values between 0.25 and 0.44 when, in addition, there is a 
monetary shock. The same coefficient is estimated at 0.95 when there is just a productivity shock. 
falling to between 0.59 and 0.76 when, in addition, a monetary shock is present. Under money 
growth shocks. estimated slopes decrease with the forecast horizon, showing an increased difficu1ty 
of forecasting longer terrn rates. We rejected the hypothesis Ho: {Jo=! 1 in (54) in all simulations 
incorporating monetary shocks. With just the preference shock, we maintained Ho with frequencies 
33%,82%,92% at horizons of 1, 2 and 3 quarters, suggesting more predictability oflonger term 
returns. The economy with both. preference and technology shocks. behaves like the one with just 
the latter. whose efects seem to dominate those of random shocks to preferences, at least for the 
values we have used for their variances. 
Regressions in differences [Table 3] yielded results consistent with those in the levels ofthe 
excess returns: slopes close to 1 without the monetary shock, just to become much lower in presence 
of a monetary shock. The unít slope hypothesis is rejected in all simulations except when the shock 
in preferences is the only one presento 
&timation of (55) in Table 4produced slopes close to zero withjust the shock in preferences, 
increasing with the forecasting horizon, to fall in the range 0.56 to 0.72 when we added tbe money 
shock. The hypothesis Ha: (1=0, consistent with the expectarions theory of the term strueture, was 
maintained with frequencies 33%.42%.24%, at horizons of 1. 2 and 3 quarters. but was always 
rejected with the monetary shock. Results withjust the productivity shock were numerically similar, 
even though in tbat case we always rejected Ro. with or without the money shock added to the model. 
The economy with the technology and preferences shocks behave again as that with just the 
productivity shock. Estimation of regressions in differences in Table 5 produced results consistent 
with the previous ones: forward rates predict a good deal of future holding returns fluctuations when 
there is a money growth shock in the econorny. Without ¡t, the hypothesis of no predictability is also 
maíntained, although the estimated slope is close to zero. 
These results show that it is hard not to reject the expectations hypothesis of the term structure 
in our model, except when the economy is just subject to a shock in preferences. However. the slope 
coefficients for both, the future spot rate and the excess holding returo regressions. are much farther 
away from their hypothesized value when the monetary shock is present. Monetary shocks play an 
important role in producing enough time variation in the risk term that the expectations hypothesis 
is very clearly rejected. 
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In the absence ofmonetary shocks, volatility sharply decreases over the term structure. When 
the money shock is present, all returns become more volatile, but fue increase in volatility is relatively 
much bigger for longer -term returns. Hence, long term interest rates become much harder to predict. 
Forward rates then lose predictive power for future spot rates, incorporating information on futore 
holding returns, so that the slope in (55) moves away from zero. As a consequence, forward rates 
contain relatively less informadon on future spot rates, fue slope coefficient in (54) falls significantly 
below one, and the R -squared clearly diminishes. Notice that it is not just the increased 
unpredictability of future interest rates that matters. The slope in (55) becomes different from zero 
just when fluctuations in holding premiwns accurately reflect past fluctuations in forward rates. 
To obtain evidence of time varying risk premia, not only the estimated constant terro in the 
previous regressions must be zero but also, there has to be enough variation in the unobserved risk 
premium correlated with the forward premium that the estimated slope, being significant, is less than 
one. This is important, because rejection of the expectarions hypothesis in our experiments is based 
on different causes: In absence of monetary shocks, estimated slopes are close to one and the nuU 
hypothesis fails because low volatility produces a tight sample and very precise MeO estimates with 
such small standard errors, that even slopes of .97 tum out to be statisticaUy different from one. On 
the other band, with monetary shocks, the expectations hypothesis fails to hold because there is 
enough correlation between the forward and the term premiums that the estlmated slope clearly 
deviates from one. In the spirit of the expectations hypothesis that the forward rates be good 
predictors of future spot rates, the rejection is obvious just in the case of economies subject to 
monetary shocks. 
Finally, there is nothing in our exercise that forces both slope coefficients to add up to one. 
Acording to (53), that would happen if the sum of the expectation changes in holding premiums is, 
in fact, negligable, which seems to be the case in our model, in consistency with Fama 's suggestions. 
These results have been obtained solving the modelf01wards, since we have taken as inputs 
sample realizations for the three structural shocks in technology, preferences and money growtb 
control. However, we needed to add a sample realization for one ofthe expectations errors al to 
i ' ¡, 
be able 10 produce .iamp1e paths for the rest of endogenous variables. Hence, we cannot guarantee 
that the path for a/ 'trom which we started will fulfLlI the conditions of a true expectations errOr, of 
being orthogonal to all variables in the information set of the household. 
We ran accuracy tests like in den Haan and Mareet (1989), based on sample correlations 
between the expectations errors and variables in O,. We crossed for the tests current expectations 
enors with current 4 lagged values of: real balances, feal bonds, the stocks of physical capital and 
inventories, and the three structural shocks, a total of 28 instrUments. The left column in table 6 
, 
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contains the values oftbe chi-squared statistic for errors u/, e/ and e/, for simulations with the 
shocks in technology and preferences, while the second column presents the values with the three 
shocks. The former case produces lack of orthogonality for two ofthe three independent expectations 
errors, while just one of them presents this problem when we add monetary shocks. Last column 
contains the statistics obtained exc1uding current inventories and physical capital from the instrument 
list, showing that these two variables were to blame for the detected correlation. Overall, the 
orthogonality criterium is quite closely satistled. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
We have analyzed whether general equilibrium asset pricing models can explain the empirical 
rejection of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. In an economy with a time-to-build 
technology and a cash-in-advance constraint, where salary income cannot be spent when it is 
earned, there is each pedod a portfolio of investment projects not yet productive. Consumers make 
investment contributions to each project every single period until they become productive. Hence, we 
have a well defined term structure of returns on investment. In equilibrium, they coincide with the 
returns on real bonds, and are related, through intlation expectations, with nominal rates of interest 
at different maturities. In such an economy, shocks to the rate of money growth can generate enough 
time variability in risk terros which is correlated with current forward rates, that the expectations 
hypothesis is rejected, since forward rates become biased predictors of future spot rates. Shocks 
affecting the productivity of the inputs, or preferences do not seem able, by themselves, to produce 
the result in such a clear fashion. 
The cash-in-advance liquidity constraint in a produetive economy seems to be behind the 
model' s ability to reproduce the empirical rejectíon of the expectations hypothesis. It implies that the 
shorter term nominal interest rate is Iinked to marginal utility of consumption and the marginal 
product of labor thereby not being so affected by monetary shocks as the longer term rates. 
Labadie(1994) and Backus et al,(1989) have already provided evidence to the fact that the 
rejection does not arise in an endowment economy. Whether a time-to-build technology is also 
necessary to maintain the result is at this point still an open question. 
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Table 1 
Parameter values 
Rate of time preference: 
Depreciation rate: 
Labor elasticity in production: 
Elasticity of the compased input: physical 
capital +inventories: 
Weight of physical capital, relative to inventaries: 
Number of pedads to complete an investment peaject: 
Propartions of investment projects financed each pedad: 
Average consumption 'elasticity' in utility function: 
Average 'elasticity' of leisure in utility function: 
Coefficent of relative risk aversion: 
MA parameters in expectation errors in nominal cates: 
AR(l) parameter in technology shock: 
AR(I) pararneter in preferences: 
Standard deviation of innovatían in technology shock: 
Standard deviation of innovation in preferences: 
Standard deviation of innovation in money growth cate: 
p ~ 0.99 
Ó ~ 0.025 
0.64 
0.36 
2.57 
4 
!PI = 11'2 = ¡P, = I{J. = 0.25 
1/3 
2/3 
1.50 
el = 0.91 , i=1,2,3,4 
0.90 
0.90 
0.001 
0.001 
0.01 
30 31 
Tab!e 2 
P'+i-¡ - i\ = a + {J (f,i ~ jLJ + u1+¡.i 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
j 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 
~ 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
s(/J) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
R' 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 
r' 0.05 0.50 0.67 0.62 0.74 0.86 0.34 0.66 0.81 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.05) (0.14) (0.10) (0.07) 
H,' 0.33 0.82 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Experiment 4 Experiment 5 Experiment 6 
j 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 
~ 0.44 0.29 0.25 0.76 0.63 0.59 0.76 0.65 0.60 
s(/J) 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 
R' 0.45 0.30 0.25 0.78 0.65 0.61 0.79 0.67 0.62 
r' -0.27 0.16 0.16 -0.10 0.33 0.35 -0.10 0.33 0.37 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) 
H,' 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Note: Experiment 1 contains just a shock in preferences and experiment 2 contains just a shock in 
productivity, while experiment 3 combines both shocks. Experiments 4 to 6 are the 
corresponding versions adding a money control shock. 
The tabIe sumarizes the results from 100 regressions with simulated equilibrium series, usrng 
the parameter vaIues in Table l. For each experiment, we present: averages over the 100 
simulations of: the slope {J. its standard error of estimate, the R-squared, the first arder 
residual autocorrelation r1, and the percentage of times fue null hypothesis of a unit slope was 
not rejected. The Dumber in brackets under r1 is its empirical standard deviatioD. 
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Table 3 
P,+j_l - P,+j.2 = a + (J(f! - f,J-l) + U,+j_l 
Experiment 1 Experirnent 2 Experiment 3 
j 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 
~ 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 
s(/3) 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 
R' 0,98 0,98 0,98 0,99 0,99 0,99 1,00 1,00 1,00 
" 
0,05 -0,03 -0,04 0,62 0,54 0,49 0,34 0,26 0,23 
(0,10) (0,10) (0,09) (0,11) (0,12) (0,11) (0,14) (0,14) (0,13) 
Ho' 0,33 0,35 0,33 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Experiment 4 Experiment 5 Experiment 6 
j 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 
~ 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,76 0,76 0,75 0,76 0,76 0,76 
s(/3) 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,05 
R' 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,79 0,79 0,79 
" 
-0,27 -0,29 -0,29 -0,10 -0,16 -0,15 -0,10 -0,16 -0,15 
(0,09) (0,09) (0,09) (0,08) (0,08) (0,08) (0,09) (0,09) (0,09) 
H.,' 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 
Note: See note on Table 2. 
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Table 4 
h,J - i\ = a + {3 (f,l - i1J + u!+! 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
j 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 
~ 0,03 0,06 0,10 0,05 0,09 0,13 0,05 0,09 0,12 
s(~) 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 
R' 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,50 0,46 0,49 0,35 0,32 0,35 
" 
0,05 0,00 0,13 0,62 0,09 0,36 0,35 0,05 0,28 
(0,10) (0,12) (0,08) (0,11) (0,26) (0,15) (0,14) (0,23) (0,13) 
H.,' 0,33 0,42 0,24 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Experiment 4 Experiment 5 Experiment 6 
j 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 
P 0,56 0,71 0,72 0,24 0,38 0,43 0,24 0,37 0,42 
s(P) 0,05 0,07 0,09 0,04 0,09 0,10 0,05 0,08 0,11 
R' 0,57 0,36 0,23 0,28 0,21 0,16 0,27 0,21 0,15 
" 
-0,27 -0,37 -0,16 -0.10 -0,21 -0,13 -0,10 -0,20 -0,13 
(0,09) (0,08) (0,07) (0,09) (0,08) (0,08) (0,09) (0,09) (0,08) 
H.,' 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,04 
Note: See note on Table 2. 
In this table, Ho 1 shows the percentage of times that the null hypothesis of a zero slope was 
not rejected in the simulations. 
Table 5 
h¡i - 1It-1 = a + f3W - fr l ) + UH1 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
j 2 3 4 2 3 4 
P 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,00 
s(/J) 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 
R' 0,07 0,01 0,02 0,50 0,01 0,01 
r' 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,62 0,17 0,17 
(0, lO) (0,10) (0,09) (0,11) (0,14) (0,15) 
R,' 0,33 0,96 0,88 0,00 0,93 0,94 
Experiment 4 Experiment 5 
j 2 3 4 2 3 4 
P 0,56 -0,02 -D,04 0,24 -0,01 -0,01 
s(m 0,05 0,09 0,07 0,04 0,05 0,04 
R' 0,57 0,02 0,02 0,28 0,02 0,01 
r' -0,27 0,02 0,00 -0,10 0,01 -0,01 
(0,09) (0,07) (0,11) (0,09) (0,08) (0,09) 
R,' 0,00 0,96 0,91 0,00 0,92 0,98 
Note: See nO~r on Table 4_ 
.U 
,;;. 
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Experiment 3 
2 3 4 
0,05 0,00 0,00 
0,00 0,01 0,01 
0,35 0,02 0,02 . 
0,35 0,12 0,13 
(0,14) (0,13) (0,15) 
0,00 0,93 0,91 
Experiment 6 
2 3 4 
0,24 -D,01 
-D,01 
0,05 0,05 0,04 
0,27 0,01 0,01 
-0,10 0,00 
-D,02 
(0,09) (0,08) (0, lO) 
0,01 0,95 0,95 
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Table 6 
ACCURACY TESTS 
IDENTIFICA TlON TESTS 
A B C 
45.19 29.00 28.46 
",' (4.7) (5.0) (4.9) 
(~') 
0% 97% 97% 
0% 99% 99% 
32% 100% 100% 
45.99 48.26 29.23 
'( (3.9) (4.6) (5.4) 
(r/) 
0% 1% 93% 
0% 5% 99% 
28% 52% 100% 
24.02 27.72 27.73 
,,' (5.2) (4.8) (4.8) (F¡k Ut) 
96% 99% 100% 
100% 100% 100% 
100% 100% 100% 
Note: Column A contains the results with shocks in technology and preferences. Column 
B contains the results with the tbree shocks. Column C excludes current values of 
physical capital and inventaries from the list of instruments. 
Empirical means for 100 simulations of the quadratic forro in cross rnoments of each 
expectations error and current and 4 lagged values of: M1_1/PI-I. B,_I/P¡_I' k¡+J-b Y¡. 
~1-1t, ~,_/. ~'_13, a total of 28 instruments. 
Each pannel contains: the mean, across 100 sllnulations, of the chi-squared statistic, 
its empirica! standard deviation, and the percentage of times the null hypothesis of 
orthogonality was rejected at 90%,95% and 99% confidence levels. 
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